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ABSTRACT: Our acceptance of falsely dichotomous statements is often intellectually distorting. It restricts 
imagination, limits opportunities, and lends support to pseudo-logical arguments. In conflict situations, the 
presumption that there are only two sides is often a harmful distortion. Why do so many false dichotomies 
seem plausible? Are all dichotomies false? What are the alternatives, if any, to such fundamental 
dichotomies as ‘true/false’, ‘yes/no’, ‘proponent/opponent,’ and ‘accept/reject’? 
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In a recent collection of essays, Hilary Putnam emphasizes that a distinction is not yet a 
dichotomy. Commenting on Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction and the tendency of 
many empiricist philosophers to erect a dichotomy around it, Putnam says: 
 
Once Kant’s category of the synthetic a priori ceases to be available, it becomes important <to 
acknowledge>—as many metaphysicians are still unwilling to consider—the possibility that the 
principles of mathematics are unlike both paradigm examples of analytic truths (like “all bachelors 
are unmarried”) and purely descriptive truths (like “robins have feathers”). This illustrates one 
difference between an ordinary distinction and a metaphysical dichotomy: ordinary distinctions 
have ranges of application, and we are not surprised if they do not always apply.1
 
Putnam urges that to inflate a distinction into a dichotomy is a mistake. I find this 
comment helpful, and it inspired much of the thinking in this paper. I will argue here that 
we need to distinguish between difference, distinction, disjunction, dichotomy, and 
opposition. I will argue that there are some true dichotomies, expressible in terms of 
exclusive disjunction, but that false dichotomies are many. In fact, I will contend that 
there are at least six ways in which dichotomies can be false. 
 
THE CONTEXT OF ARGUMENT 
 
In argumentation, the fault referred to as ‘false dichotomy’ nearly always lies in a 
disjunctive premise. If an argument has a disjunctive premise that is false or 
 
1 Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, Chapter One, page 10. 
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unacceptable, then that argument fails to be cogent even though it may be deductively 
valid. The disjunction that is standard in classical logic is inclusive disjunction, 
symbolized by a ‘v’. An inclusive disjunction of the form ‘A v B’ is true when at least 
one of A and B is true; there is only one condition under which it is false, and that is 
when A and B are both false. Then something else, not A and not B either, turns out to be 
true. 
Several well-known argument types involve a disjunctive premise.2 These are: 
 
• disjunctive syllogism (A v B, -B, therefore A ). 
• constructive dilemma (A v B, A > C; B> D; therefore C v D) 
• destructive dilemma (A v B; A > C; B >D; -C v –D; therefore -A v -B). 
 
Clearly all such arguments depend on the opening disjunctive premise. Even when that 
premise is flawed, they may have a deceptive persuasiveness if the disjunctive premise is 
superficially plausible. The clear logical structure and easy flow of such arguments may 
lead us to ignore flaws in the opening premise even when that premise is false. We might 
for that reason call them quasi-logical arguments. Perhaps it is for this reason that false 
dichotomy, though nearly always a premise flaw, is commonly called a fallacy. The form 
of the premise, and the context in which it appears, encourage us to accept a non-cogent 
argument as cogent. 
 A different kind of mistake in argument involving disjunction is the following: 
 
• A v B; B; therefore –A 
 
The above mistake involves treating the symbol ‘v’ as though it represents an exclusive 
disjunction, not an inclusive one. (So far as I know, this error has no particular name.) 
One source of this mistake lies in an uneasy match between natural language and 
formalism. Although ordinary uses of “or” are often exclusive, the symbol ‘v’ represents 
inclusive ‘or.’ If ‘or’ were understood exclusively, an inference similar to the one above 
would not amount to a mistake. Consider, for example: 
 
He could either use the money to go to Africa or to attend a summer school in Oxford. He has 
registered for the summer school. So he’s not going to Africa.  
If the opening disjunctive premise is false, the argument will still be flawed – but not 
inferentially.3
 
FALSE DICHOTOMY AND CLAIMS 
 
Falsely dichotomous claims will be my main focus in this paper. As noted, many claims 
expressed as disjunctions are false or unacceptable; yet we may easily gloss over them 
and take them to be true. Why? We may begin by recalling that there are (at least) two 
sorts of opposite, contraries (for predicates, a thing can’t be neither x nor y, 
corresponding to the inclusive ‘or’; the disjunction is supposed to exhaust the 
                                                 
2 For typographical convenience the symbol ‘>’ is use represent the horseshoe connective. 
3 What is needed for this argument to work is not a full-fledged exclusive disjunction <(A v B). –(A.B)>, 
but only the latter conjunct. In other words: ‘not both.’ 
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possibilities) and contradictories (a thing can’t be both x and y and can’t be neither x nor 
y, corresponding to the exclusive ‘or’). We easily confuse contradictories and contraries. 
Consider the following pairs of terms: safe and unsafe, wise and unwise, healthy and 
unhealthy. We think in terms of opposites and judge hastily that a practice must be either 
safe or unsafe; a book interesting or uninteresting; a person healthy or unhealthy, wise or 
unwise. When we do this, we construct, around contrary terms, a disjunction that we take 
to be exhaustive, and we go wrong because it would only be exhaustive if the terms were 
contradictory. Our disjunctive statement would be true only if there were no intermediate 
cases – nothing between safe and unsafe, wise and unwise, healthy and unhealthy, 
interesting and uninteresting. Obviously, such intermediate cases do exist: mistaking 
contraries for contradictories, we exclude a middle that should not be excluded. A word 
to the partially wise should be sufficient here. 
 This mistake is encouraged by various linguistic constructions – especially, as 
illustrated here, the way in which the particular “un” functions to construct alternative 
descriptions. But we don’t need the encouragement of linguistic particles to lapse into 
this sort of error: we can mistake contraries for contradictories even in the absence of that 
phenomenon. For example, if we suppose that people must be either beautiful or ugly, 
successes or failures, fat or thin, winners or losers, competitive or cooperative, we have 
again taken contraries for contradictories and constructed disjunctions that are false 
because they are not exhaustive. At this point it may seem less plausible to blame 
language for our mistakes. One might, rather, suspect some deep binary tendency in our 
ways of thinking. It’s perfectly obvious that many people are neither beautiful nor ugly, 
neither successes nor failures, and so on. Even when an entity falls in the category to 
which the contrary terms properly apply, neither contrary may apply; if that is the case, 
the disjunction we have constructed around the contraries is false. 
You may at this point be reminded of the old joke: there are two kinds of people, 
those who think in binary terms and those who don’t. I suspect that if this fundamental 
bifurcation did exist, the second group mentioned would be rather small. Dare I say it? It 
even seems (somehow) natural for human creatures to think in binaries. And this despite 
the fact that two is a small number, a fact that we all know perfectly well.  
 You might suggest that in some deep way human beings are hard-wired for binary 
thinking. You might say, well, we human beings want clear simple choices and the basic 
structure of choice is ‘one or the other; nothing else; not both.’ You might suggest that 
this binary style of thinking is established for us by our evolutionary history, during most 
of which limiting ourselves to binary apparatus was an advantage. The legendary case of 
the saber-toothed tiger comes to mind. When the tiger attacks, the situation is ‘fight or 
flight.’ There are just two possibilities, you might say. Any primitive woman with a 
greater capacity for complexity, pausing perhaps to consider other choices like climbing a 
tree or singing sweetly to the tiger, would have been eaten dead or alive. She would not 
live to tell her tale and would leave no surviving descendants, so her capacity to construe 
her choices using a number larger than two would not persist in the human population. 
The idea of binary hard-wiring, grounded in evolutionary adaptation, is interesting, 
perhaps even plausible. But I cannot pause to explore it further here.  
 Suffice it to say that what we construct as binary alternatives often fail to be 
exhaustive, and we make mistakes, over-simplifying situations by failing to detect that 
fact. A common route to this mistake is that of using contrary terms as though they were 
3 
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contradictory, constructing statements around that opposition and lapsing into false 
dichotomies as a result. For convenience, let us call this the error of contrariety. The error 
of contrariety is that of excluding a middle that really does exist – and reducing to a 
binary a situation in which there are more than two possibilities. 
  Though familiar and highly important, the error of contrariety is not the only way 
we can construct a false dichotomy. There is much more to be said. 
 
FALSE DICHOTOMY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
Many conceptual frameworks are binary, constructed on the basis of a fundamental 
division between one sort of thing and another. Such frameworks may be described in 
various ways – as dualistic, dichotomous, or bifurcated, for example. In a dichotomous 
framework where X and Y are fundamental organizing concepts, it is presumed that no X 
is Y and everything the framework handles is either X or Y. In other words, the 
disjunction between X and Y is interpreted as one that is exclusive in the logician’s sense. 
If we want to express this disjunction in terms of classical logic, we need more than the 
symbol ‘v’. If X and Y are genuine binaries, then an entity must be either X or Y and 
cannot be both.4 In other words, 
 
• Exclusive disjunction: (X v Y). –(X.Y). 
 
For convenience, I will use another symbol, ‘#”, to express exclusive disjunction. For 
present purposes, then, 
 
• ‘X#Y’ means (X v Y). –(X.Y) 
 
As we have seen, it is easy to make mistakes with inclusive disjunctions. But these errors 
are only the beginning of the story, because true dichotomies require more than true 
inclusive disjunctions. What they require is true exclusive disjunctions.5
 
TRUE DICHOTOMOES AND FALSE DICHOTOMIES 
 
A true dichotomy requires a true exclusive disjunction. In other words, X and Y are truly 
dichotomous if X#Y is true. This stipulation is, I think, close to the way in which we 
understand dichotomy. It does not restrict itself to the ‘v’ of classical logic. Consider, for 
example, standard thinking about male and female. Though such thinking has been 
challenged, and in my view challenged correctly,6 standard thinking would have it that 
there is a true dichotomy between male and female human beings. To assume that this 
                                                 
4 For convenience here, I have allowed myself to talk about X and Y as predicates and also as statements. 
Strictly speaking this is not correct. If X is a predicate, then ‘item a is X’ is a statement. When ‘X’ is used 
here in disjunctions or conjunctions, it is the statement use that is intended, and ‘X’ should be taken as 
shorthand for a statement of the type ‘item a is X’. 
5 That is to be expected, given the greater content. But, as will be apparent, it is not only this further content 
–(A.B) that gives the further possibilities. The point is that non-exhaustiveness, or erroneously excluding 
the middle, is only one of at least six ways of constructing a false dichotomy. 
6 Michael Gilbert has an eloquent and well-argued paper defending this conclusion. “Defeating Bi-
genderism” was presented at the OSSA meetings in Hamilton, Ontario in 2005. 
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dichotomy does exist is to assume that every human being is either male or female 
(exhaustiveness) and that no human being is both male and female (exclusivity). Males 
are not females, females are not males, and every one of the entities to which the 
male/female distinction applies must be one or the other. In other words, we typically 
assume that ‘male’ and ‘female’ are contradictory predicates.  
 Accepting that a true dichotomy is an exclusive disjunction, one to be represented 
here as X#Y, it becomes immediately clear that there are at least three ways in which one 
can have a false dichotomy. 
 
(i) The disjunction between X and Y is not exhaustive (a middle exists) 
(ii) The disjunction between X and Y is not exclusive (things can be both X and Y) 
(iii) The disjunction X or Y is neither exclusive nor exhaustive (a middle exists and 
things can be both) 
 
But interestingly, this is not all. There are other ways a dichotomy can be false. These 
include, at least, the following: 
 
(iv) The disjunction X or Y is ill-formed. Its constituent terms are too contestable to 
convey a clear meaning, and for this reason we cannot clearly assert that 
everything we are trying to classify fits one of X or Y and not both. The terms 
grounding the supposed dichotomy are too unclear to convey even contraries, 
much less contradictories. You might say that this flaw is of type (iii), where the 
disjunction is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. But that would not be quite 
right, due to the lack of clarity. Plausible examples here are nature/nurture; 
fact/value; inductive/deductive; competition/cooperation; modern/post-modern; 
genetic/environmental; and violence/non-violence. To make such allegations 
requires often requires some detailed argument. It could even be argued that the 
disjunction ‘male or female’ should be placed in this category.7 You might urge 
that point by arguing that the distinction between male and female can be drawn 
in different ways: sexual organs, other physical characteristics, hormonal 
patterns, sexual orientation, and so on. 
 
(v) There are items that one might assume to be classifiable using the XY 
framework but in fact, these items are off the spectrum to which X and Y apply. 
This problem is not that of the erroneously excluded middle: the recalcitrant 
cases in fact fail to fit the XY framework at all. The lack of fit may come from 
the fact that this framework has been devised with reference to characteristics 
the recalcitrant items do not have and were never supposed to have. Consider, 
here, the question of whether the Green Party is on the left or the right of the 
political spectrum.8 Since the ‘left/right’ distinction politically is organized 
around issues of social equality and liberty, we will seriously misunderstand the 
pro-environment Green Party if we seek to classify it in the traditional terms of 
left and right. Here, including the middle and thinking of a spectrum rather than 
                                                 
7 The term “poly-gendered” is sometimes used to allow for the multiple possibilities. I owe this point to 
Dayna Daniels. 
8 Thanks to Colin Hirano for this example. 
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just two ends will not suffice for accurate understanding. The Green Party will 
not be right, or left, or center, given that its raison d’etre stems from 
environmental problems rather than from issues of liberty and social justice. 
Another example might be asking whether music composed in a non-Western 
tradition is ‘in tune’ or ‘out of tune’ when you understand what it is to be in tune 
with reference to the traditions of Western music. Although music is of course 
the sort of thing that can be in tune or out of tune, for this kind of music, to ask 
whether it is in tune in this sense would a misplaced question. To say ‘it is in 
tune or it is not’ will be incorrect, and to allow for its being ‘somewhat in tune’ 
would not avoid the problem, if, indeed, it makes sense at all. 
 
(vi) We have a situation of indeterminacy. It is, as yet, unspecified or unknowable 
whether X or Y is true, so we cannot, with any warrant, assert either X or Y. 
There is, then, no sense in insisting that at least one and at most one of X, Y is 
true. An old example of indeterminacy may be found in the case of the speckled 
hen.9 If I see a speckled hen, the image or ‘sense datum’ that I have presumably 
has some number of speckles, but I cannot say what that number is. Given that 
there is no specific knowable number here, there is a deep indeterminacy in the 
case. And given this indeterminacy, we would be lapsing into a false dichotomy 
were we to insist that the number of speckles characterizing my image of the 
speckled hen must be either odd or even. There is no true dichotomy here 
between ‘the number is odd and the number is even.’ These statements, in this 
context, do not amount to true contradictories because of the third possibility of 
indeterminacy. Another case of indeterminacy is that in which an issue is one of 
law but has never come before the courts. If it is brought before the courts, this 
issue will be resolved and there will be an answer. But prior to that time there is 
none.10 
 
I argue, then, that there are at least six ways in which a dichotomy can be false. 
 
THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
It is interesting and useful to distinguish the ways in which a dichotomy can be false. By 
doing this, we achieve more accuracy and clarity and a deeper appreciation of what has 
gone wrong. We will also be better able to see what is needed in order to correct the 
                                                 
9 The case was originally couched in terms of the sense datum theory of perception. If I see a speckled hen, 
what I am aware of (the sense datum) has some number of speckles. But if the hen has many speckles, I am 
aware of no particular number of speckles that it has. Thus the dichotomy between ‘my image of the hen 
has an even number of speckles’ and ‘my image of the hen has an odd number of speckles’ is a false 
dichotomy. Its falseness lies in this indeterminacy; the image has neither an odd, nor an even, number of 
speckles. The case was first introduced by Roderick Chisholm in “The Problem of the Speckled Hen,” 
Mind 51 (1942), 368 – 373. A.J. Ayer in The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillan 
1963) argued that there was no number of speckles that the sense datum of the speckled hen had.  
10 My awareness of this kind of example is due to Michael Kubara. Legal indeterminacy may be alleged on 
the straightforward grounds that the case would need to go to court and has not yet done so, which was 
what Kubara had in mind. Legal indeterminacy might be alleged on more radical grounds, as in Critical 
Legal Studies, in which scholars contend that law is indeterminate because the class of available legal 
materials rarely provides compelling logical grounds for one single response to a case. 
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error. In cases where the problem is one of non-exhaustiveness, we have neglected the 
middle of a spectrum of cases and may have failed even to appreciate the very existence 
of the spectrum. We miss possibilities and see only extremes where there are none. In 
cases where there is a failure of exclusivity, we have again neglected subtleties and 
complexities, and we are setting up contrasts more stark and oppositions more 
exaggerated than are appropriate. When the problem is one of indeterminacy, we have 
reason to examine our expectations, which are not realistic in the case, and cannot be met; 
we are asking for truth and falsity in a situation where neither can be obtained. Where it 
is confusion or a matter of being off the spectrum, the exposure of the problem will, 
again, show a need for re-thinking. 
 
DISTINCTION, DISJUNCTION, AND OPPOSITION 
 
There is a series here, one that fascinates me. It goes like this: 
 
Difference: Items we observe in the world differ and we want to mark that difference in 
language, so we need a distinction expressible in words. 
 
Distinction: in the sense of early exclusion. We distinguish between things that are x and 
things that are y. (This marking of a distinction implies that no item is not both x and y at 
the same time and in the same respect). Distinction at this first stage may be said to 
commit us to what I will call early exclusion: -(X.Y). We need here the qualification that 
we are considering the same thing in the same respect.11 With that qualification, early 
exclusion is the relationship of not both. Interestingly, at this stage, distinction does not in 
any obvious sense establish disjunction: on the surface level at least, the language of ‘not 
both’ is not yet that of either inclusive or exclusive disjunction.12 We can introduce the 
symbol ‘/’ to represent ‘not both’, so that –(X.Y) is represented as X/Y.13
 
Distinction: in the sense of exclusive disjunction. We develop the distinction between X 
and Y into a full-fledged exclusive disjunction, adding an ‘or’ component to the ‘not 
both’. We progress from X/Y to X#Y. We are now saying, we have noted this difference, 
introduced this distinction, and this distinction is a binary one. Everything that can be 
classified using the x,y distinction is either x or y and not both. We have now arrived at 
exclusive disjunction, proceeding to this point from early exclusion. (The ‘or’ that we add 
here is the inclusive ‘or’; by adding it we are stipulating exhaustiveness of the distinction; 
we are insisting that everything classified using the x-y distinction must fall into at least 
one and at most one of these categories. We have now used our distinction to construct a 
fundamental divide.) At this point we have marked a difference in the world, introducing 
the language of x and y to articulate a distinction marking that difference. We have 
moved from noting that, given the difference, the same thing cannot have the properties x 
                                                 
11 Aristotle emphasizes this point when explaining the Principle of Non-Contradiction. 
12 The qualification “on the surface level at least” is introduced here to allow for the fact that all the 
connectives of classical logical are expressible in terms of the Scheffer stroke function, which means ‘not 
both.’ 
13 ‘Not both’ is exclusionary but it is not exclusive disjunction. That is ‘X/Y’ is not tantamount to X#Y, as 
defined here. 
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and y in the same respect and moved further to assert exhaustiveness: everything to 
which the distinction applies must be either x or y. Now we have a full-fledged exclusive 
disjunction; the things we are classifying cannot be both x and y, and must be one or the 
other. 
 
Dichotomous framework: At this stage we are using our distinction as a central element in 
a conceptual framework. The exclusive disjunction we have introduced on the basis of 
our distinction gains a sort of metaphysical or organizing status. Things in the framework 
are assumed to be either x or y and not both, and their status in this regard is taken to be 
an important fact about how they fit into the world and are related to each other. We 
come to think of x and y as full-fledged opposites. There is genuine contradictoriness. 
And there may be something more when we begin to see these opposites as representing 
conflicting possibilities. 
 
Opposition: We proceed to a stage of opposition. This opposition may be purely logical 
and expressed in its entirety by the exclusive disjunction. It may be a ‘mere’ logical fact 
that the entities we are considering with regard to x and y have to be one or the other and 
cannot be both; we are taking a statement of the form X#Y to be true. X and Y are in this 
sense conflicting statements, strong opposites; we understand them as contradictory. We 
may come to think of these opposites as ‘opposed,’ and a new element of adversariality, 
may enter the picture at this point. People may argue for and against these ‘conflicting’ 
claims, thus coming to be proponents and opponents -- and in the process they begin to 
argue for and against each other. While theorists may wish to use terms ‘proponent’ and 
‘opponent’ in a purely logical sense, the terms very easily and naturally acquire overtones 
of adversariality. In social contexts in particular, we may come to think that there are 
those who can be characterized as x and those who can be characterized as y -- and ‘never 
the twain shall meet.’ We may note that the x’s and the y’s are different, mark the 
distinction in language, express the point disjunctively, construct a dichotomy, and add an 
oppositional interpretation. The x’s may are seen as opposed to the y’s and against them. 
Thus tones of competition, contention, or hostility are added to the picture.14 Logical 
opposition has yielded adversariality. 
 
Polarization: Are these different and distinguishable people separate? Separated? 
Opposite? Opposed? Conflicting? Contending? Perhaps We are all x, and the Others are 
y; it is Us and Them. Perhaps x is a positive quality and y not so; we may produce a 
construction of the Good Guys and the Bad Guys. In social contexts, opposition may 
proceed to enmity, intensifying a social conflict. The dichotomy, logically one of 
exclusive disjunction, is construed as marking a fundamental opposition between two 
sides, as in George W. Bush’s notorious statement, “You are with us or you are with the 
terrorists.” In many serious conflicts, to be an x is to be strongly opposed to y’s, and 
conversely. In the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, if you were a Serb, you were anti-
Croat; if you were a Croat, you were anti-Serb. In Northern Ireland during the Troubles, 
                                                 
14 I have written about such matters elsewhere. See Trudy Govier, The Philosophy of Argument (Newport 
News, VA: Vale Press 1999), Chapter Four, “Feminists, Adversaries, and the Integrity of Argument,” and 
Chapter Fourteen, “The Positive Power of Controversy.” 
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if you were a Catholic, you were anti-Protestant, and if you were a Protestant, you were 
anti-Catholic.  
 In the March, 2007 elections in Northern Ireland, results suggested that there is 
still deep polarization in the society. The two parties supported were the DUP (with a 
record of Protestantism and anti-Republicanism) and the SF (with a record of Catholicism 
and anti-Loyalism). The Reverend Ian Paisley, who built a long career on virulent anti-
Catholic rhetoric, faced the challenge of working out a cooperative agreement with Sinn 
Fein, the political arm of the Irish Republic Army. Gerry Adams of the SF faced a similar 
challenge. There are warnings here. If you work your way into polarization, you may 
have trouble working your way out. But of course logic is only a part of such stories. 
 
Demonization: Polarization intensifies to the point where the x’s see the y’s as admitting 
of nothing good: they are demonic or Satanic. We have progressed from ‘opponent’ to 
‘bad’ to ‘evil’ at this point. The rhetoric of ‘the Pope as the anti-Christ’ provides an 
illustration here.15 The expression, ‘the Great Satan,’ used by Iranian leaders in referring 
to the United States, provides another. 
 
De-humanization: At this point, there is so much animosity and hostility that even 
demonization seems charitable. One side begins to categorize the other as sub-human. 
‘The Others are not Us; they are not even human.; They are ‘cockroaches,’ ‘vermin,’ 
‘apes,’ ‘barbarians,’ ‘the scum of the earth’ or ‘creatures from the jungle.’ 
 
 There is, then, a slippery journey that we may take, from difference to polarization, 
demonization, or de-humanization. We can take this journey -- but I don’t recommend it. 
We should embark, but stop along the way -- probably somewhere in the territory of 
Opposition. 
 
FIVE OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
 
1. Objection: It is all too easy to allege a false dichotomy. This has become a truistic and 
trite move, one made by so many post-modernists and feminists that it has lost all 
interest. 
Reply: The move may be common but that does not mean it is useless. There is the 
possibility that people often make this move precisely because mistakes are made with 
dichotomies. These mistakes are made in different ways, and in different contexts. 
Dichotomies discourage imagination and an awareness of complexity and encourage 
reductionism and simplistic thinking. 
 
2. Objection: We are hard-wired to think in binary terms and we have to organize things 
this way, so there is no point in resisting. 
Reply: we don’t know that we are hard-wired to think in binary terms. Given that we are 
capable of understanding things like the spectrum, the middle, and complexity theory, 
any claim to the effect that our brains insist on no more than two is contestable. 
                                                 
15 In Belfast, the Reverend Ian Paisley has used this logic. I was stunned to learn, on a trip to Belfast in the 
fall of 2003, that people even wrote Ph.d. theses on the rhetoric of the Pope as the anti-Christ. 
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Furthermore, there have been eminent thinkers – Kant, Hegel, Peirce, and Dewey come to 
mind – who have strongly preferred thinking in threes.16
 
3. Objection: We need dichotomous apparatus like ‘true/false’ and ‘yes/no’. 
Reply: This point is correct and is acknowledged here. There is no denial here of the 
claim that contradictory statements exist and from them we can form true dichotomies. If 
X and Y are contradictory statements, then X#Y is true: one or the other of X and Y has 
to be true, and both cannot be true. 
 
4. Objection: You are making things unbearably complex, insisting not only that there are 
so many false dichotomies, but that these appear in various contexts and are of six 
different kinds. This framework is too complex to be useful. 
Reply: the world is not a simple place. Vastly complex systems and entities are 
understood in science and elsewhere, so there is ample evidence that the human mind can 
cope with complexity. 
 
5. Objection: Your own analysis is dichotomous, so your account is self-refuting. 
Reply: distinctions are not dichotomies; nor do they always support dichotomies. The 
objection would hold only if I were to argue that there are no true dichotomies while 
myself asserting a dichotomy to be true. While I maintain here that there are many false 
dichotomies, and at least six different ways they can be false, I do not maintain that there 
are no true dichotomies. 
 
link to commentary
                                                 
16 One could of course work out a logic for true and false trichotomies; obviously that task cannot be 
accomplished here. 
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